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Abstract
It has been shown that deep neural networks (DNNs) may be vulnerable to adver-
sarial attacks, raising the concern on their robustness particularly for safety-critical
applications. Recognizing the local nature and limitations of existing adversarial
attacks, we present a new type of global adversarial attacks for assessing global
DNN robustness. More specifically, we propose a novel concept of global adversar-
ial example pairs in which each pair of two examples are close to each other but
have different class labels predicted by the DNN. We further propose two families
of global attack methods and show that our methods are able to generate diverse
and intriguing adversarial example pairs at locations far from the training or testing
data. Moreover, we demonstrate that DNNs hardened using the strong projected
gradient descent (PGD) based (local) adversarial training are vulnerable to the
proposed global adversarial example pairs, suggesting that global robustness must
be considered while training robust deep learning networks.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been applied to many applications including safety-critical tasks
such as autonomous driving [1] and unmanned autonomous vehicles (UAVs) [2], which demand high
robustness of decision making. However, recently it has been shown that DNNs are susceptible to
attacks by adversarial examples [3]. For image classification, for example, adversarial examples may
be generated by adding crafted perturbations indistinguishable to human eyes to legitimate inputs to
alter the decision of a trained DNN into an incorrect one. Several studies attempt to reason about
the underlying causes of susceptibility of deep neural networks towards adversarial examples, for
instance, ascribing vulnerability to linearity of the model [3] or flatness/curvedness of the decision
boundaries [4]. A widely agreed consensus is certainly desirable, which is under ongoing research.
Target global adversarial attack problem. The main objectives of this work are to reveal potential
vulnerability of DNNs by presenting a new type of attacks, namely global adversarial attacks,
propose methods for generating such global attacks, and finally demonstrate that DNNs enhanced
by conventional (local) adversarial training exhibit little defense to the proposed global adversarial
examples. While several adversarial attack methods were proposed [3, 5–8] in recent literature,
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we refer to these methods as local adversarial attack methods as they all aim to solve the local
adversarial attack problem defined as follows.
Definition 1. Local adversarial attack problem. Given an input space Ω, one legitimate input
example x ∈ Ω with label y ∈ Y , and a trained DNN f : Ω→ Y , find another (adversarial) input
example x′ ∈ Ω within a radius of  around x under a distance measure defined by a norm function
‖·‖ : {xa − xb |xa ∈ Ω,xb ∈ Ω} → R≥0 such that f (x′) 6= y, ‖x′ − x‖ ≤ .
Typically, the above problem is solved via optimization governed by a loss function, L : Y ×Y → R,
measuring the difference between the predicted label f (x′) and y:
x′∗ = argmax
‖x′−x‖≤,x′∈Ω
L (f (x′) , y) . (1)
Importantly, the above problem formulation has two key limitations. (1) it is deemed local in the
sense that it only examines model robustness inside a local region centered at each given input x,
which in practice is chosen from the training or testing dataset. As such, local adversarial attacks
are not adequate since evaluating the DNN robustness around the training and testing data does not
provide a complete picture of robustness globally, i.e. in the entire space Ω. On the other hand,
assessment of global robustness is essential, e.g. for safety-critical applications. (2) local attack
methods assume that for each clean example x the label y is known. As a result, they are inapplicable
to attack the DNN around locations where no labeled data are available.
In this paper, we propose a notion of global DNN robustness and a global adversarial attack problem
formulation to assess it. We evaluate global robustness of a given DNN by assessing the potential
high sensitivity of its decision function with respect to small input perturbation leading to change
in the predicted label, globally in the entire Ω. By solving the global attack problem, we generate
multiple global adversarial example pairs such that each pair of two examples are close to each other
but have different labels predicted by the DNN. The detailed definitions are presented in Section 2.
Related works. Apart from the local adversarial attacks, several other approaches for DNN robust-
ness evaluation have been reported. The Lipschitz constant is utilized to bound DNNs’ vulnerability
to adversarial attacks [9, 10]. As argued in [11, 12], however, currently there is no accurate method
for estimating the Lipschitz constant, and the resulting overestimation can easily render its use
unpractical. [13, 14] propose to train a generative model for generating unseen samples for which
misclassification happens. However, the ground-truth labels of generated examples must be provided
for final assessment and these examples do not capture model’s vulnerability due to high sensitivity
to small input perturbation.
Our contributions. We propose a new concept of global adversarial examples and several global
attack methods. Specifically, we (a) propose a novel concept called global adversarial example pairs
and formulate a global adversarial attack problem for assessing the model robustness over the entire
input space without extra data labeling; (b) present two families of global adversarial attack methods:
(1) alternating gradient adversarial attacks and (2) extreme-value-guided MCMC sampling attack, and
demonstrate their effectiveness in generating global adversarial example pairs; (c) using the proposed
global attack methods, demonstrate that DNNs hardened using strong projected gradient descent
(PGD) based (local) adversarial training are vulnerable towards the proposed global adversarial
example pairs, suggesting that global robustness must be considered while training DNNs.
2 Global adversarial attacks
We formulate a new global adversarial attack problem as follows.
Definition 2. Global adversarial attack problem. Given an input space Ω and an DNN model
f : Ω → Y , find one or more global adversarial example pairs (x1,x2) ∈ Ω × Ω within a radius
of  under a distance measure defined by a norm function ‖·‖ : {xa − xb |xa ∈ Ω,xb ∈ Ω} → R≥0
such that f (x1) 6= f (x2) , ‖x1 − x2‖ ≤ .
When no confusion occurs, global adversarial example pair and global adversarial examples are
used interchangeably throughout this paper. The above problem formulation can be cast into an
optimization problem w.r.t. a certain loss function L : Y × Y → R in the following form:
x∗1,x
∗
2 = argmax
‖x1−x2‖≤,(x1,x2)∈Ω×Ω
L (f (x1) , f (x2)) (2)
2
For convenience of notation, we use Lf (x1,x2) to denote L (f (x1) , f (x2)). The above definition
and problem formulation have several favorable characteristics. A robust DNN model should be
insensitive to small input perturbations. Therefore, two nearby inputs shall share the same (or similar)
model output. Conversely, any large Lf (x1,x2) value of two nearby inputs reveals a sharp transition
over the decision boundary in a classification task or an unstable region in a regression task.
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Figure 1: Global vs. local adversarial
examples.
Loosely speaking, the maximum of Lf (x1,x2) over the
entire input space can serve as a measure of global model
robustness. If it is larger than a preset threshold, the DNN
may be deemed as vulnerable towards global adversarial
attacks. On the other hand, (2) is a global optimization
problem for which multiple near-optimal solutions may
be reached by starting from different initial solutions or
employing different optimization methods. Practically,
any pair of two close inputs x1,x2 with different model
predictions in the case of classification or a sufficiently
large value of Lf (x1,x2) in the case of regression may
be considered as a global adversarial example pair.
It is important to note that our problem formulation doesn’t
restrict adversarial examples to be around a certain input
example as in the case of the existing local adversarial
attacks; it only sets an indistinguishable distance between
a pair of two input examples in order to examine the entire input space, e.g. at locations far away
from the training or testing dataset. Fig. 1 contrasts the conventional local adversarial examples
with the proposed global adversarial examples. Importantly, our global attack formulation does not
require additional labeled data; it directly measures the model’s sensitivity to input perturbation and
be applied globally in the entirety of the input space.
We propose two families of attack methods to solve (2) as a way of generating global adversarial
examples: 1) alternating gradient global adversarial attacks and 2) extreme-value-guided MCMC
sampling global adversarial attack, as discussed in Section 3 and Section 4, respectively.
3 Alternating gradient global adversarial attacks
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Figure 2: Alter-
nating attack illus-
tration.
For global adversarial example pair generation per (2), a pair of two examples
(x1,x2) shall be be optimized to maximize the loss Lf (x1,x2) under a distance
constraint. We propose a family of attack methods called alternating gradient
global adversarial attacks which proceed as follows: 1) start from an initial
input pair; 2) fix the first example, and then attack (move) the second under the
distance constraint while maximizing the loss Lf (x1,x2) using a gradient-based
local adversarial attack method, referred to as a sub-attack method here, 3) swap
the roles of the first and (updated) second examples, i.e. fix the second example
while attacking the first, 4) repeat this process for a number of iterations, as
shown in Fig. 2.
Given a DNN model f and a loss function L, a sub-attack method can be
characterized using a function x′ = fs_attk (x, y,Rx,; f,L) constructing an
adversarial example x′ w.r.t example x and its corresponding label y, where
Rx, = {x+ δ| ‖δ‖ ≤ } specifies the region for adversarial sample generation.
Suppose we start with an initial example pair
(
x
(0)
1 ,x
(0)
2
)
, then we get the
(i+ 1)-round example pair from the (i)-round sample pair by:
x
(i+1)
1 = fs_attk
(
x
(i)
1 , f
(
x
(i)
2
)
,R
x
(i)
2 ,
; f,L
)
(3)
x
(i+1)
2 = fs_attk
(
x
(i)
2 , f
(
x
(i+1)
1
)
,R
x
(i+1)
1 ,
; f,L
)
(4)
Here, to attack one example, we use the other example’s model prediction as the label when applying
the sub-attack method fs_attk so that the difference between two examples’ model predictions is
maximized. In the meanwhile, the search region for attacking one example is constrained (centered)
3
by the other example. Hence, the distance between the two examples is always less than . Equations
3 and 4 are invoked to alternately attack x(i)1 and x
(i)
2 to generate an updated example pair for the
next round. As the global attack continues, multiple global adversarial sample pairs may be generated
along the way.
Algorithm 1 Global PGD attack algorithm for classification.
Input:
Initial starting example pair
(
x
(0)
1 ,x
(0)
2
)
; Example vector dimension D; distance constraint ;
Number of total rounds N ; Number of sub-attack steps S; Step size a for the sub-attack.
Output: The set of generated global adversarial sample pairs T ;
1: T = {}
2: for i← 1 to N do
3: Sample a uniform distribution perturbation δ ∼ U [−, ]D
4: x(i)1 ← Clip
(
x
(i−1)
1 + δ,Rx(i−1)2 ,
)
5: for j ← 1 to S do
6: x(i)1 ← Clip
(
x
(i)
1 + a · sign
(
∇x1Lf
(
x
(i)
1 ,x
(i−1)
2
))
,R
x
(i−1)
2 ,
)
7: end for
8: Sample a uniform distribution perturbation δ ∼ U [−, ]D
9: x(i)2 ← Clip
(
x
(i−1)
2 + δ,Rx(i)1 ,
)
10: for j ← 1 to S do
11: x(i)2 ← Clip
(
x
(i)
2 + a · sign
(
∇x2Lf
(
x
(i)
2 ,x
(i)
1
))
,R
x
(i)
1 ,
)
12: end for
13: T ← T ∪
{(
x
(i)
1 ,x
(i)
2
)}
14: end for
Choice of sub-attack methods. We leverage the popular gradient-based local adversarial attack
methods as sub-attack methods under the above family of global attacks. Particularly, the fast gradient
sign method (FGSM) [3], iterative FGSM (IFGSM) [7], and projected gradient descent (PGD) [8]
may be considered for sub-attack method fs_attk. As one example, we present the algorithm flow
for the global PGD (G-PGD) attack targeting classifiers with PGD employed as the sub-attack in
Algorithm 1, where the Clip (x,mathcalR) function drags the input x outside the preset regionR
onto the boundary ofR. The global IFGSM (G-IFGSM) skips the random noise perturbations (steps
3 and 8). The global FGSM (G-FGSM) sets the number of sub-attack steps S to be 1 and the step
size for sub-attack a to be  in addition to ignoring the random noise perturbation steps.
4 Extreme-value-guided MCMC sampling attack
While the family of alternating gradient global adversarial attacks discussed in Section 3 can work
effectively in practice, such methods may get trapped at a local maximum, degrading the quality of
global attack. To this end, we propose a stochastic optimization approach based on the extreme value
distribution theory and Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method, which is more advantageous
from a global optimization point of view.
Extreme value distribution. Consider sampling a set of i.i.d input example pairs
{(x1,1,x2,1) , · · · , (x1,n,x2,n)} in the input pair space Ω × Ω. The greatest loss value L∗ =
maxi∈[1,n] Lf (x1,i,x2,i) can be regarded as a random variable following a certain distribution
characterized by its density function pL∗ (l). The Fisher-Tippett-Gnedenko theorem says that the
distribution of the maximum value of examples, if exists, can only be one of the three families of
extreme value distribution: the Gumbel class, the Fréchet and the reverse Weibull class [15]. Hence,
pL∗ (l) falls into one of the three families as well, whose cumulative density function (CDF) FL∗ (l)
4
can be written in a unified form, called the generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution:
FL∗ (l) =
 exp
(
−
(
1 + ξ l−µσ
)−1/ξ)
ξ 6= 0
exp
(
− exp
(
− l−µσ
))
ξ = 0
(5)
where µ, σ and ξ are the location, scale, and shape parameter for the GEV distribution and may be
obtained through the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE).
Assuming that the desired generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution of the loss function is
available, multiple large loss values, corresponding to potential global adversarial example pairs,
may be generated by sampling the GEV distribution. The added benefit here is that the inherent
randomness in this sampling process may be explored to find more globally optimal solutions.
Nevertheless, since the GEV distribution may not be easily sampled directly, We adopt the Markov
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method to sample the GEV distribution [16]. In reality, the GEV
distribution is not known a priori and shall be estimated using MLE based on a sample of data as
described below.
Extreme-value-guided MCMC sampling algorithm (GEVMCMC). The proposed GEVMCMC
algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2 for the case of classification problems. There exist two essential
components for MCMC sampling: the target distribution, which is in this case the desired GEV
distribution, and the proposal distribution, which is a surrogate distribution easy to sample. For each
MCMC round, we collect an example from the proposal distribution, and then accept this example or
discard it while keeping the previous one based on an acceptance ratio pA in Step 6 of Algorithm 2
[16]. In order to sample the block maximum for the extreme value distribution, a block of example
pairs are collected from the proposal distribution in each round as in Step 3 of the algorithm instead
of a single example. As the MCMC sampling process proceeds, the actual sampling distribution
implemented converges to the target (GEV) distribution.
Algorithm 2 Extreme-value-guided MCMC sampling algorithm (GEVMCMC) for global attack.
Input: Initial starting example pair
(
x
(0)
1 ,x
(0)
2
)
; Number of total rounds N ; Number of warm-up
rounds Nw; Block size B; Number of example pairs k used for GEV distribution update;
Output: The set of the generated global adversarial example pairs T ;
1: Apply G-PGD for Nw rounds to warm-up and update T.
2: for i← Nw + 1 to N do
3: Sample B i.i.d. samples
{(
x
[1]
1 ,x
[1]
2
)
, · · · ,
(
x
[B]
1 ,x
[B]
2
)}
from the proposal distribution
q
(
x1,x2|x(i−1)1 ,x(i−1)2
)
4: (x∗1,x
∗
2)← argmaxj∈[1,B] Lf
(
x
[j]
1 ,x
[j]
2
)
5: Update the GEV distribution pL∗ (l) using top k loss values in the history.
6: pA ← min
{
1.0,
pL∗ (Lf (x∗1 ,x∗2))q
(
x
(i−1)
1 ,x
(i−1)
2 |x∗1 ,x∗2
)
pL∗
(
Lf
(
x
(i−1)
1 ,x
(i−1)
2
))
q
(
x∗1 ,x
∗
2 |x(i−1)1 ,x(i−1)2
)}
7: Sample a uniform random variable α ∼ U [0, 1]
8: if α ≤ pA then
9: Accept the new example.
(
x
(i)
1 ,x
(i)
2
)
= (x∗1,x
∗
2)
10: else
11: Reject and keep the previous example.
(
x
(i)
1 ,x
(i)
2
)
=
(
x
(i−1)
1 ,x
(i−1)
2
)
12: end if
13: T ← T ∪
{(
x
(i)
1 ,x
(i)
2
)}
14: end for
Importantly, the generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution pL∗ (l) of the loss function doesn’t
exist at the beginning of the algorithm. Therefore, it is estimated during the sampling process. Two
techniques are considered to obtain an accurate GEV distribution. A warm-up procedure (Step 1
in Algorithm 2) using a few rounds of G-PGD is performed first to collect a few global adversarial
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example pairs of large loss values. In each round, the top k loss values among all example pairs in the
history including the ones in the current block are selected to estimate pL∗ (l) based on MLE in Step
5 of Algorithm 2.
Proposal distribution design. The convergence speed of MCMC sampling towards the target
distribution critically depends on the proposal distribution [16]. To efficiently generate high-quality
global adversarial example pairs, we consider the following essential aspects in designing the proposal
distribution: (1) finding large loss values; (2) enabling global search; (3) constraining two examples
in each pair to be within distance .
p
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1
p
x
2
p
x
g
[ ]i
cx
[ ]j
cx
[ ]i
[ ]j
Figure 3: MCMC pro-
posal distribution design
illustration.
We decompose the sampling of an example pair into two sequential
steps: sample the center location xc and sample the difference vector
∆ between the two examples. Then, we construct the example pair by
x1 = xc + ∆,x2 = xc − ∆, as shown in Fig. 3. The two sampling
steps are independent of each other, and hence, the proposal distribution
conditioning on the previous example pair (xpc ,∆
p) is split into a product
of a center proposal and difference proposal distribution:
q (xc,∆|xpc ,∆p) = qxc (xc|xpc ,∆p) q∆ (∆|xpc ,∆p) . (6)
As such, the distance constraint for the two examples is only taken into
consideration in the design of q∆ (∆|xpc ,∆p) and no distance constraint
is necessary when sampling the center.
We speed up the convergence of MCMC by incorporating the (normalized)
gradient information
g =
∇xcLf (xpc + ∆p,xpc −∆p)
|∇xcLf (xpc + ∆p,xpc −∆p)|
(7)
into the proposal distribution design. We design the center proposal distribution to be a multi-variate
Gaussian distribution centered at xpc with a covariance matrix biasing to sampling along the gradient
direction g to increase the likelihood of finding large loss values while allowing sampling in other
directions during the same time:
qxc (xc|xpc ,∆p) = N
(
xpc , λ
2
0I+
(
λ2m − λ20
)
ggT
)
, (8)
where λ2m sets the largest eigenvalue and λ
2
0 < λ
2
m sets all other eigenvalues of the covariance matrix.
The absolute values of λ0 and λm control the size of the search region while the ratio between λm
and λ0 determines to what extent we want to focus on the gradient direction.
The gradient sign information is incorporated into the difference proposal distribution considering the
distance constraint . Particularly, for the l∞ norm based distance measure, we propose a Bernoulli
distribution with parameter pB > 0.5 for each element of the difference vector:
∆i =
{

2 sign (gi) with probability pB− 2 sign (gi) with probability 1− pB , (9)
which ensures that the pair (x1,x2) be within distance  and each difference component is more
likely to be set according to the corresponding gradient sign component.
5 Experimental results
Experimental settings. We investigate several local and global methods on two popular image
classification datasets: MNIST [17] and CIFAR10 [18]. To evaluate DNN robustness globally in the
input space, we create an additional class “meaningless” and append 6,000 and 5,000 random noisy
images (one tenth of the original training dataset) under this “meaningless” class into the original
MNIST and CIFAR10 training datasets, respectively, and refer to the expanded training datasets as
the augmented training datasets. All trained DNNs perform classification across 11 classes.
For MNIST, we train a neural network with two convolutional and two fully-connected layers with an
accuracy of 99.43% with 40 training epochs. For CIFAR10, a VGG16 [19] network is trained for 300
epochs, reaching 94.25% accuracy. Furthermore, we globally attack adversarially-trained models,
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which are trained using adversarial training based on local adversarial examples. In each epoch of
adversarial training, the adversarial samples are generated by attacking the DNN model from the last
epoch using a 30-step local white-box PGD attack, which is considered a strong first-order attack
[8]. And then an updated model is trained using both the augmented training set and the generated
adversarial images. Adversarial training process is performed for additional 40 epochs for the MNIST
model and 30 epochs for the CIFAR10 model, respectively. The ratio of the weighting parameters
between the losses of the examples in the augmented training set and adversarial examples are 1 : 1.
Adversarial attack parameter settings. The l∞ norm based perturbation limit (the maximum
allowed difference between two close images) is set to MNIST = 0.1 for MNIST and to CIFAR10 =
0.005 for CIFAR10. We add another 10,000 random images with the “meaningless” class label into
the original testing dataset (10,000 samples) to create an augmented testing dataset. We experiment
three common local adversarial attack methods: FGSM [3], IFGSM [7], and PGD [8], referred to as
L-FGSM, L-IFGSM and L-PGD in this paper. Both L-IFGSM and L-PGD perform a 30-step attack
with a l∞ step size of /10. All local attacks are performed on the augmented testing set.
All four proposed global adversarial attack methods are considered: alternating gradient global
adversarial attack with different sub-attack methods of FGSM (G-FGSM), IFGSM(G-IFGSM) and
PGD (G-PGD); extreme-value-guided sampling global attack (GEVMCMC). For all global attack
methods, we randomly pick 100 images from the original testing dataset and from the appended
random testing dataset, respectively, to form the first images of the 100 starting pairs. The second
image of each pair is obtained by adding small uniformly-distributed random noise bounded by
perturbation size  to the first image. 100 rounds of optimization are performed by all global
adversarial attack methods, generating a two sets of 10,000 adversarial example pairs, one set for each
of the two starting conditions: start with the 100 original testing images, start from the 100 appended
random testing images. G-IFGSM and G-PGD share the same parameter settings with their local
attack counterparts L-IFGSM and L-PGD, respectively. The number of GEVMCMC initial G-PGD
warm-up rounds is 10 for MNIST and 30 for CIFAR10. The block size B is set to be 59. Three
parameters for the proposal distribution for MNIST are λm = 1.2MNIST , λ0 = 0.3MNIST , pB =
0.95, and for CIFAR10 they are set to be λm = 4.8CIFAR10, λ0 = 0.6CIFAR10, pB = 0.99.
Generated global adversarial sample pairs. The proposed global adversarial attack methods
can generate diverse global adversarial pairs which are rather different from typical local attacks,
representing a new type of DNN vulnerability. Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 show a set of global adversarial
example pairs generated by GEVMCMC for the two datasets. In each sub-figure, the two images
on the top are the starting pair of two identical starting images. The two at the bottom are the final
global adversarial pair generated after 100 rounds of optimization steps. “N" indicates that the class
label predicated by the model is “meaningless".
Compared to standard local adversarial attacks, the proposed global adversarial pairs are much more
diverse and intriguing. For instance, it is possible to start with two identical random meaningless
image but end up with some other two random images that are very similar to each other but have
different legitimate class labels predicted by the model such as ones in Fig. 4a and 4d. We can also
start from two identical images of a legitimate predicted class, and end up with two images with
predicated labels that are different from each other and are also different from the starting label, as
shown in Fig. 4b, 4e, 4f, 5b and 5e. Clearly, the existing local attacks such as FGSM, IFGSM, and
PGD are not able to generate such complex global adversarial scenarios, which reveal additional
hidden vulnerabilities of the model.
Importantly, the existing local adversarial attacks cannot explore the input space beyond the training
or testing dataset due to the perturbation constraint. In contrast, the proposed global adversarial
attacks are very appealing in the following way: they may find a path towards unseen input space and
check the model robustness along the way. For instance, we may start from some random testing
image (Fig. 5a) or original testing image (Fig. 5c), and end up with a completely different image
pair which may be both recognized by the humans as a legitimate class, however, the model predicts
different labels for them. For instance, the final pairs in the Fig. 5a and Fig. 5c may be recognized as
“8" and “4", respectively, which are completely different from their starting label.
Local vs. global adversarial attacks Table 1-4 show the global adversarial attack results for the
MNIST and CIFAR10 models without and with local adversarial training. If the model predictions
7
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Figure 4: Global adversarial sample pairs for the CIFAR10 model generated by GEVMCMC.
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Figure 5: Global adversarial sample pairs for the MNIST model generated by GEVMCMC.
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Table 1: Natural MNIST model (w/o local adversarial training) adversarial attack results.
Method Start from Original Test Image Start from Random Test Image
Attack Rate Max Loss Avg. Loss Attack Rate Max Loss Avg. Loss
L-FGSM 18.18% 20.94 0.77 5.82% 6.43 0.16
L-IFGSM 29.80% 21.76 1.17 51.96% 7.64 1.18
L-PGD 29.59% 21.73 1.16 49.44% 7.57 1.13
G-FGSM 99.14% 23.40 10.78 99.01% 20.04 9.62
G-IFGSM 99.92% 22.21 9.19 100.00% 12.05 5.94
G-PGD 99.94% 20.44 10.18 100.00% 11.94 6.58
GEVMCMC 99.93% 24.93 14.91 100.00% 19.98 12.67
Table 2: Adversarially-trained MNIST model adversarial attack results.
Method Start from Original Test Image Start from Random Test Image
Attack Rate Max Loss Avg. Loss Attack Rate Max Loss Avg. Loss
L-FGSM 3.28% 15.14 0.11 0.00% 0.00 0.00
L-IFGSM 3.89% 15.56 0.13 0.00% 0.06 0.00
L-PGD 3.88% 15.57 0.13 0.00% 0.05 0.00
G-FGSM 98.07% 17.79 8.19 97.50% 19.09 7.63
G-IFGSM 99.47% 14.25 7.84 99.56% 17.81 11.43
G-PGD 99.50% 18.08 8.61 99.58% 19.59 12.07
GEVMCMC 99.38% 18.28 9.91 99.55% 18.06 12.04
Table 3: Natural CIFAR10 model (w/o local adversarial training) adversarial attack results.
Method Start from Original Test Image Start from Random Test Image
Attack Rate Max Loss Avg. Loss Attack Rate Max Loss Avg. Loss
L-FGSM 26.77% 11.42 1.90 0.00% 0.01 0.00
L-IFGSM 44.80% 12.06 3.58 0.00% 0.02 0.00
L-PGD 43.92% 12.04 3.51 0.00% 0.02 0.00
G-FGSM 95.96% 12.75 8.72 95.15% 11.10 5.48
G-IFGSM 99.68% 12.90 11.02 98.36% 10.76 6.45
G-PGD 99.71% 13.55 11.30 98.33% 11.02 6.70
GEVMCMC 99.58% 13.18 8.94 98.37% 11.02 7.18
Table 4: Adversarially-trained CIFAR10 model adversarial attack results.
Method Start from Original Test Image Start from Random Test Image
Attack Rate Max Loss Avg. Loss Attack Rate Max Loss Avg. Loss
L-FGSM 19.29% 10.97 0.83 0.00% 0.00 0.00
L-IFGSM 21.25% 11.03 0.92 0.00% 0.00 0.00
L-PGD 21.19% 11.03 0.92 0.00% 0.00 0.00
G-FGSM 95.29% 9.62 4.11 90.47% 6.57 2.52
G-IFGSM 98.23% 9.83 4.60 95.85% 6.99 2.94
G-PGD 98.26% 10.54 4.77 95.88% 6.97 3.03
GEVMCMC 98.25% 10.89 5.47 95.89% 6.66 3.67
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Table 5: Comparison between GEVMCMC and other proposed global attacks when starting from the
same 100 original test (“Test") or 100 random testing (“Rand") example pairs. Each entry shows the
number of cases out of the total 100 cases where the final adversarial pair generated by GEVMCMC
has a loss higher than the one generated by the other method.
Method
MNIST CIFAR10
Natural Adv.-Trained Natural Adv.-Trained
Test Rand Test Rand Test Rand Test Rand
G-FGSM 86 95 69 81 33 72 76 67
G-IFGSM 98 100 92 90 69 85 84 92
G-PGD 97 100 80 67 12 73 74 90
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Figure 6: Loss value found by global adversarial attack in each round for the natural MNIST model.
for the two examples in a generated global adversarial pair are different, we regard this pair as one
successful global attack. In these tables, the attack rate is defined as the ratio between the successful
number of attacks over the total number of trails which is 10,000. The Max loss and Avg. loss are the
maximum loss and average loss found in the attack process.
Attacking the natural MNIST and CIFAR10 models using a local attack method can reach a reason-
ablly high attack rate. For instance, L-PGD has an attack rate of 29.59% in the case of the natural
MNIST, which drops down to 3.88% for the case of the adversarially-trained MNIST model, showing
that adversarial training using local adversarial examples does improve the defense to such local
attacks. However, all global adversarial attack methods achieve almost 100.00% attack rate and
produce much higher average loss values compared to the local attack methods, regardless whether
local adversarial training is performed or not. It is evident that adversarial training based on local
adversarial examples shows none or little defense to global attacks. This indicates the effectiveness
of the proposed global attack methods, and equally importantly, suggests that global adversarial
examples defined in this paper must be coped with when training robust DNN models.
Comparison of the proposed global adversarial attack methods Table 5 compares the two types
of the proposed global attack methods when starting from the same 100 original test (“Test") or
100 random testing (“Rand") example pairs. Each entry shows the number of cases out of the total
100 cases where the final adversarial pair generated by GEVMCMC has a loss higher than the one
generated by the other method. Most entries in the table are larger than 50, implying that GEVMCMC
finds worse adversarial example pairs than other global adversarial attack methods. We further show
the maximum loss value and average loss value of the adversarial example pairs in each round in
Fig. 6 - 9. After the initial warm-up rounds using G-PGD, the loss found by GEVMCMC increases
rapidly, and ends up with a much larger value compared to that of the other global adversarial attack
methods, which tend to converge at a local maximum. The only case in which GEVMCMC does not
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Figure 7: Loss value found by global adversarial attack in each round for the adversarially-trained
MNIST model.
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Figure 8: Loss value found by global adversarial attack in each round for the natural CIFAR10 model.
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Figure 9: Loss value found by global adversarial attack in each round for the adversarially-trained
CIFAR10 model.
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beat other global adversarial attack methods is the attacking of the natural CIFAR10 model starting
with the original testing images, showing the overall better effectiveness of GEVMCMC.
6 Conclusion
We propose a new global adversarial example pair concept and formulate the corresponding global
adversarial attack problem to assess the robustness of DNNs over the entire input space without
human data labeling. We further propose two families of global adversarial attack methods: (1)
alternating gradient global adversarial attacks and (2) extreme-value-guided MCMC sampling global
attack (GEVMCMC), demonstrating that DNN models even trained with local adversarial training
are vulnerable to this new type of global attacks. Our attack methods are able to generate diverse and
intriguing global adversarial which are very different from typical local attacks and shall be taken into
consideration when training a robust model. GEVMCMC demonstrates the overall best performance
among all proposed global attack methods due to its probabilistic nature.
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